Its interesting to watch football evolve. A few weeks ago I remember having a debate with peeps here about Wayne Rooney. Some were arguing that he is a Number 9. Others were saying that he is a Number 10. People have had the same conundrum about Cristiano Ronalso, Messi and Thierry Henry in the past. Are they wingers, strikers, or playmakers. In the end people have given up and come up with the definition forward for all attacking players. But that is too loose a definition. Can you really group Torres, Ronaldo, Messi, Drogba, Rooney, Kaka in the same category??
So now a new definition has come up, a position called the False Nine. This is someone who starts the game at the tip of the attack but also has licence to roam and allow other players to get beyond him. It is a feature of a team who dont have an out and out striker.
Messi played the game against Real Madrid last night as a false 9.
So there you go. We now have a striker, a winger, a playmaker, and a false nine
0
THE FALSE NINE
Started by
Grand Ayatollah Dismantler
, Apr 11 2010 11:35 AM
21 replies to this topic
#4
StrangeBtTru
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Posted 11 April 2010 - 01:14 PM
i think this is a good analysis and many teams have cancelled out that traditional #9 who just sits and waits for the kill. Maybe it can be deduced that this is a form of making the team more effective as a whole and can help maximise attacking as well as defensive options.
#5
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Posted 11 April 2010 - 01:26 PM
Jonathan Wilson wrote about the false 9 last year , the main article is longer but these are some of teh interesting bits
.
Where did the false nine come from?
In England, the centre-forward tended traditionally to be a big target-man figure – what Brian Glanville characterised as "the brainless bull at the gate". His job was, essentially, to meet crosses. Elsewhere, though, where skill was prioritised over physicality, he soon became something rather more subtle, and there is evidence to suggest that by the 1920s it was not uncommon for centre-forwards in central Europe and around the River Plate to drop deep.
The first England came across was Matthias Sindelar in a friendly against Austria at Stamford Bridge in 1932. England ended up winning 4-3, but there was a widespread recognition that Sindelar, a slight but imaginative forward, had unnerved England by moving into midfield, looking to make the play as much as to finish chances.
In Argentina and Uruguay at the time, it was common for the two inside-forwards to play very deep, and it would be strange if there hadn't been some kind of experimentation with a centre-forward dropping off as well. Certainly by the time of River Plate's fabled La Maquina side of the late 40s, the nominal centre-forward, Adolfo Pedernera, often dropped off, with Angel Labruna, the inside-left, becoming the main goal threat.
English teams continued to be perplexed by forwards who refused to stand still and let themselves be marked. Vsevolod Bobrov unsettled everybody he played against on Dinamo Moscow's 1945 tour; Alfred Bickel's performance was the main reason for England's defeat to Switzerland in 1947; and in 1951, in what was technically only a representative game, an England XI lost 3-1 to an Argentina XI, their centre-half, Malcolm Barrass, having been dragged out of position by the Argentinian centre-forward José Lacasia.
England's manager Walter Winterbottom, acknowledging the problem, held a team meeting to try to come up with a counter-measure for the full international that was scheduled for a few days later. "Some people wanted to have a man following him," he said, "dogging his footsteps, but Billy [Wright] quite vehemently wanted the centre-half to stay back, in position, and let someone else pick off Lacasia.
"We decided that [Harry] Johnston, the centre-half, would go with him in the early part of the match, with Billy and Jimmy Dickinson [the two wing-halves] covering the gap in the middle, then Johnston would fall back in favour of someone else so that the Argentina team would not quite know if we were going to persist in man-to-man marking. But the match was washed out by rain after 20 minutes play so that the issue was not really joined."
Two years later, Johnston found himself similarly bemused by Nandor Hidegkuti, as England were beaten 6-3 by Hungary at Wembley. "To me," he wrote in his autobiography, "the tragedy was the utter helplessness … being unable to do anything to alter the grim outlook." Fabio Cannavaro admitted something similar after Real Madrid had been beaten 6-2 by Barcelona at the Bernabéu last season.
Why is the false nine so hard to combat?
Man-marking barely exists at the top level of the game any more, at least not in open play, but even with zonal marking the game falls into certain patterns. When 4-4-2 meets 4-4-2, for instance, essentially the two centre-backs pick up the two centre-forwards, the two central midfielders deal with the two central midfielders, and the wide-midfielders pick each other up, with the full-backs behind should one wide midfielder get beyond the other one.
One of the keys to tactical success is to break those patterns in a way that is advantageous; at its most basic level to overman in key zones. If a centre-forward drops deep, he is moving away from the centre-backs who would naturally mark him. If the centre-back follows, he risks leaving space that can be exploited by wide players cutting in, or by midfielders coming from deep. But if he sits off, the deep-lying centre-forward has freedom, time and space either to pick his pass or to turn and run at a defence so he is arriving at the centre-back at pace, which makes him far harder to stop.
The holding midfielder could pick up the deep-lying centre-forward, but that has knock-on effects elsewhere on the pitch. When 4-4-2 meets 4-4-2, if a centre-forward drops back into midfield, he effectively gives his team three men in there against two; there is overmanning. Equally, a midfielder restricting his attacking role to pick up an opposing centre-forward risks surrendering territory, so his team end up playing too deep, inviting pressure.
Why has the issue arisen again?
English football, with its simplistic tactical shapes, has traditionally struggled with players who don't stand where they're supposed to, which in part explains the success of the likes of Eric Cantona, Gianfranco Zola and Dennis Bergkamp in the 90s. Just by operating in the grey area between the opponent's defensive and midfield lines, they caused confusion, and created new, unfamiliar angles of attack.
Back then, though, teams tended to play with a more orthodox central striker ahead of the deep-lying player and so, while they proved difficult to combat, they were easy to conceptualise as a strike partnership (they were not false nines so much as orthodox 10s). One centre-back picked up the orthodox forward, and the other had a certain licence to follow the deeper-lying one, secure in the knowledge he had a central defender behind him, and that, if the wide midfielders were doing their job, at least one of the full-backs was likely to be free to tuck in. The trend towards a single central striker, though, has taken us back to a situation similar to that of the early 50s.
When a back four meets a 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1, the full-backs, even ignoring the increased attacking role they have in today's game, have a clearly defined role in negating the opposition wingers. They are less likely, in other words, to be able to provide cover. But worse, if the false nine drops deep, there are two centre-backs left redundant. One can follow the false nine, but the other is left isolated, with space all around and the full-backs too busy with their own concerns to help him. He can be attacked from wide or from deep, and he has no support.
That is the position in which Harry Johnston found himself in 1953, with the cherry-red blur of Laszlo Budai, Sandor Kocsis, Ferenc Puskas and Zoltan Czibor swarming all around him, and the player he thought he was supposed to be marking off directing things in the far distance, wandering forward at will to score three times. And it was the position in which Cannavaro found himself in May.
Guardian
.
Where did the false nine come from?
In England, the centre-forward tended traditionally to be a big target-man figure – what Brian Glanville characterised as "the brainless bull at the gate". His job was, essentially, to meet crosses. Elsewhere, though, where skill was prioritised over physicality, he soon became something rather more subtle, and there is evidence to suggest that by the 1920s it was not uncommon for centre-forwards in central Europe and around the River Plate to drop deep.
The first England came across was Matthias Sindelar in a friendly against Austria at Stamford Bridge in 1932. England ended up winning 4-3, but there was a widespread recognition that Sindelar, a slight but imaginative forward, had unnerved England by moving into midfield, looking to make the play as much as to finish chances.
In Argentina and Uruguay at the time, it was common for the two inside-forwards to play very deep, and it would be strange if there hadn't been some kind of experimentation with a centre-forward dropping off as well. Certainly by the time of River Plate's fabled La Maquina side of the late 40s, the nominal centre-forward, Adolfo Pedernera, often dropped off, with Angel Labruna, the inside-left, becoming the main goal threat.
English teams continued to be perplexed by forwards who refused to stand still and let themselves be marked. Vsevolod Bobrov unsettled everybody he played against on Dinamo Moscow's 1945 tour; Alfred Bickel's performance was the main reason for England's defeat to Switzerland in 1947; and in 1951, in what was technically only a representative game, an England XI lost 3-1 to an Argentina XI, their centre-half, Malcolm Barrass, having been dragged out of position by the Argentinian centre-forward José Lacasia.
England's manager Walter Winterbottom, acknowledging the problem, held a team meeting to try to come up with a counter-measure for the full international that was scheduled for a few days later. "Some people wanted to have a man following him," he said, "dogging his footsteps, but Billy [Wright] quite vehemently wanted the centre-half to stay back, in position, and let someone else pick off Lacasia.
"We decided that [Harry] Johnston, the centre-half, would go with him in the early part of the match, with Billy and Jimmy Dickinson [the two wing-halves] covering the gap in the middle, then Johnston would fall back in favour of someone else so that the Argentina team would not quite know if we were going to persist in man-to-man marking. But the match was washed out by rain after 20 minutes play so that the issue was not really joined."
Two years later, Johnston found himself similarly bemused by Nandor Hidegkuti, as England were beaten 6-3 by Hungary at Wembley. "To me," he wrote in his autobiography, "the tragedy was the utter helplessness … being unable to do anything to alter the grim outlook." Fabio Cannavaro admitted something similar after Real Madrid had been beaten 6-2 by Barcelona at the Bernabéu last season.
Why is the false nine so hard to combat?
Man-marking barely exists at the top level of the game any more, at least not in open play, but even with zonal marking the game falls into certain patterns. When 4-4-2 meets 4-4-2, for instance, essentially the two centre-backs pick up the two centre-forwards, the two central midfielders deal with the two central midfielders, and the wide-midfielders pick each other up, with the full-backs behind should one wide midfielder get beyond the other one.
One of the keys to tactical success is to break those patterns in a way that is advantageous; at its most basic level to overman in key zones. If a centre-forward drops deep, he is moving away from the centre-backs who would naturally mark him. If the centre-back follows, he risks leaving space that can be exploited by wide players cutting in, or by midfielders coming from deep. But if he sits off, the deep-lying centre-forward has freedom, time and space either to pick his pass or to turn and run at a defence so he is arriving at the centre-back at pace, which makes him far harder to stop.
The holding midfielder could pick up the deep-lying centre-forward, but that has knock-on effects elsewhere on the pitch. When 4-4-2 meets 4-4-2, if a centre-forward drops back into midfield, he effectively gives his team three men in there against two; there is overmanning. Equally, a midfielder restricting his attacking role to pick up an opposing centre-forward risks surrendering territory, so his team end up playing too deep, inviting pressure.
Why has the issue arisen again?
English football, with its simplistic tactical shapes, has traditionally struggled with players who don't stand where they're supposed to, which in part explains the success of the likes of Eric Cantona, Gianfranco Zola and Dennis Bergkamp in the 90s. Just by operating in the grey area between the opponent's defensive and midfield lines, they caused confusion, and created new, unfamiliar angles of attack.
Back then, though, teams tended to play with a more orthodox central striker ahead of the deep-lying player and so, while they proved difficult to combat, they were easy to conceptualise as a strike partnership (they were not false nines so much as orthodox 10s). One centre-back picked up the orthodox forward, and the other had a certain licence to follow the deeper-lying one, secure in the knowledge he had a central defender behind him, and that, if the wide midfielders were doing their job, at least one of the full-backs was likely to be free to tuck in. The trend towards a single central striker, though, has taken us back to a situation similar to that of the early 50s.
When a back four meets a 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1, the full-backs, even ignoring the increased attacking role they have in today's game, have a clearly defined role in negating the opposition wingers. They are less likely, in other words, to be able to provide cover. But worse, if the false nine drops deep, there are two centre-backs left redundant. One can follow the false nine, but the other is left isolated, with space all around and the full-backs too busy with their own concerns to help him. He can be attacked from wide or from deep, and he has no support.
That is the position in which Harry Johnston found himself in 1953, with the cherry-red blur of Laszlo Budai, Sandor Kocsis, Ferenc Puskas and Zoltan Czibor swarming all around him, and the player he thought he was supposed to be marking off directing things in the far distance, wandering forward at will to score three times. And it was the position in which Cannavaro found himself in May.
Guardian
#8
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Posted 11 April 2010 - 02:17 PM
golonice, on 11 April 2010 - 01:59 PM, said:
Guus Hiddink knows how to deal effectively with this problem, he can orchestrate man-marking of the highest order.
He should have put someone on Iniesta though that boy is dangerous roaming alone at the edge of the box.
#10
chikomana
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Posted 11 April 2010 - 04:22 PM
Ndozvatogara kutaura pano kuti at some point someone comes along that is so good at what they do, coaches literally change their set up to suit them. Thats why you can't describe a position based on a marquee player. The game evolves and changes to suit the trailblazers. The basic positions do not change.
Before we had vana Ronaldo and Rooney we had vana Cantona. Moses Chunga was exactly the same yet people seem to be amazed thinking this is new! Aitamba papi Chunga?
I remember Roberto Carlos being so good literally every team started using a leftback who ventures forward. Even Zimbabwe then converted Bully to leftback, yet just a few years back Kateya played exactly like Carlos. Gullit and Rijkaard were so versatile and effective at every position and along came what we know as links between defenders, mid and strikers into the mordern game as we know it. All midfielders were able to dictate play....but Zidane was so effective at what he did Makelele was used sorely to defend and pass to him. Now we have everyone trying to effect a DM position.
The Germans were so effective using sweepers and everyone started doing it. Now we have a flat 4 with twin striker and versatile wingbacks. That allowed vana Koeman playing as defenders.
Before we had vana Ronaldo and Rooney we had vana Cantona. Moses Chunga was exactly the same yet people seem to be amazed thinking this is new! Aitamba papi Chunga?
I remember Roberto Carlos being so good literally every team started using a leftback who ventures forward. Even Zimbabwe then converted Bully to leftback, yet just a few years back Kateya played exactly like Carlos. Gullit and Rijkaard were so versatile and effective at every position and along came what we know as links between defenders, mid and strikers into the mordern game as we know it. All midfielders were able to dictate play....but Zidane was so effective at what he did Makelele was used sorely to defend and pass to him. Now we have everyone trying to effect a DM position.
The Germans were so effective using sweepers and everyone started doing it. Now we have a flat 4 with twin striker and versatile wingbacks. That allowed vana Koeman playing as defenders.
#11
chikomana
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Posted 11 April 2010 - 05:24 PM
Roberto Carlos akachinja game and to think we had had our own Kateya, Dzimbiri and even Carlos Max who had been playing like that for ages! Makelele akachinja game but we already had Konjera and we didn't want him to play like that!
Although Barca used the 4-3-3 effectively with Eto, Messi and Henry, I think Ferguson's successful use of it with Rooney, Nani and Valencia upfront mira uone kuti kuchatsvagwa ma winger mangani over the next few years. Already Chelsea ndokwayava kuinda.
But at least after every team trying to get big, strong and versatile wooden players like Lampard and the Africans.....the big one will be teams trying to have their own little Lionel Messi!
Although Barca used the 4-3-3 effectively with Eto, Messi and Henry, I think Ferguson's successful use of it with Rooney, Nani and Valencia upfront mira uone kuti kuchatsvagwa ma winger mangani over the next few years. Already Chelsea ndokwayava kuinda.
But at least after every team trying to get big, strong and versatile wooden players like Lampard and the Africans.....the big one will be teams trying to have their own little Lionel Messi!
#12
Mahwan
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Posted 11 April 2010 - 05:24 PM
True that Chikomana, even Matheus played like an alround midfielder back in the day, another underrated great in my opinion, the guy was damn good at that. Footie moved from the traditional number 9 and supporting wingers, but it is not extinct, the old 4-3-3 formation, we still see it in Barca.
#13
John Kachere
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Posted 11 April 2010 - 05:53 PM
Makelele and the defensive midfielder MYTH... There was always a DM in the game; my beloved juve used to have them since I dont remember when. Even Didier Deschamps came earlier than Makelele. Even in classic 4-4-2 there were 2 guys who were defensive in most cases.
Because makelele went on to play in EPL his position sudenly became "new". Fun thing, Gilberto was already at Arsenal? he played the same role. Another funn thing for thoz who think football suddenly needed DMs I dont recall Man U buying a DM to change with the times.
A role that has become defunct is that of a SWEEPER, the world once became obsessed with that extra defender
Did the changes in offside rule coz the extinction of this position?
Football formations always relied on your available players. Brazil has used that "false nine" for some time me thinks. Rivaldo Ronaldo combination and the Bebeto romario combination and the Dinho Ronaldo combination too.
maybe in England its new coz of Rooney
Because makelele went on to play in EPL his position sudenly became "new". Fun thing, Gilberto was already at Arsenal? he played the same role. Another funn thing for thoz who think football suddenly needed DMs I dont recall Man U buying a DM to change with the times.
A role that has become defunct is that of a SWEEPER, the world once became obsessed with that extra defender
Did the changes in offside rule coz the extinction of this position?Football formations always relied on your available players. Brazil has used that "false nine" for some time me thinks. Rivaldo Ronaldo combination and the Bebeto romario combination and the Dinho Ronaldo combination too.
maybe in England its new coz of Rooney
#16
Grand Ayatollah Dismantler
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Posted 11 April 2010 - 07:47 PM
kachere, on 11 April 2010 - 05:53 PM, said:
Makelele and the defensive midfielder MYTH... There was always a DM in the game; my beloved juve used to have them since I dont remember when. Even Didier Deschamps came earlier than Makelele. Even in classic 4-4-2 there were 2 guys who were defensive in most cases.
Because makelele went on to play in EPL his position sudenly became "new". Fun thing, Gilberto was already at Arsenal? he played the same role. Another funn thing for thoz who think football suddenly needed DMs I dont recall Man U buying a DM to change with the times.
A role that has become defunct is that of a SWEEPER, the world once became obsessed with that extra defender Did the changes in offside rule coz the extinction of this position?
Football formations always relied on your available players. Brazil has used that "false nine" for some time me thinks. Rivaldo Ronaldo combination and the Bebeto romario combination and the Dinho Ronaldo combination too.
maybe in England its new coz of Rooney
Because makelele went on to play in EPL his position sudenly became "new". Fun thing, Gilberto was already at Arsenal? he played the same role. Another funn thing for thoz who think football suddenly needed DMs I dont recall Man U buying a DM to change with the times.
A role that has become defunct is that of a SWEEPER, the world once became obsessed with that extra defender
Did the changes in offside rule coz the extinction of this position?Football formations always relied on your available players. Brazil has used that "false nine" for some time me thinks. Rivaldo Ronaldo combination and the Bebeto romario combination and the Dinho Ronaldo combination too.
maybe in England its new coz of Rooney
The Sweeper system using 3 central defenders (two man markers and one sweeper/libero) was depended on attacking wing backs to make up for the lack of wingers in the system. It also depended on 2 of the 3 central defenders facing two out and strikers from the other side
Now most teams only play with one (or even zero) orthodox stikers thuis rendering the need for 3 centrak defenders obsolete. Wingers are also more attacking and float more so you cant leave marking them to wingbacks anymore
#18
Mahwan
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Posted 11 April 2010 - 09:11 PM
Scolari used the system GAD is referring to in 2002 if i am not mistaken, he had three at the back, Lucio, Edmilson Roque Junior at the back, with Carlos and Cafu as left and right wingers, Klerbesron and Gilberto pakati with Dinho behind Rivas and Ronaldo, i liked that set up very fluid.
#20
golonice
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Posted 11 April 2010 - 11:37 PM
Big Sam Allardyce usually favours the 5-5-0 formation, with a false number 9 roaming about freely in mid, disturbing, fouling and randomly venturing into attack as and when required after the tradmark 40m long pass from defence headquarters.
Diouf is usually tasked with that role at Blackburn, and sometimes the task is given to Samba, especially at away matches. At Bolton it was Stelios or Diouf and Allardyce's 5-5-0 took them to Europe.
Diouf is usually tasked with that role at Blackburn, and sometimes the task is given to Samba, especially at away matches. At Bolton it was Stelios or Diouf and Allardyce's 5-5-0 took them to Europe.
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